



Hash functions



hash functions maps



Any change in m changes $h(m)$

we need more properties from a cryptographic hash function because the adversary controls things

preimage resistance: given $y \in H$ it is hard to find $x \in M$ with $y = h(x)$

This is no harder than $O(2^n) = O(|H|)$ size of hash space

by just a brute-force attack: pick $x \in M$, compute $h(x)$ and compare to y . Repeat if $h(x) \neq y$.

Second-preimage resistance: given $x \in M$, it is hard to find $x' \in M$ with $x \neq x'$ and $h(x) = h(x')$.


same attack finds x' in $O(2^n)$.

collision resistance: it is hard to find $x \neq x' \in M$ with $h(x) = h(x')$.

same attack (random picking & comparing) takes $O(2^{n/2})$ by birthday paradox.

Want to use Pollard rho to save memory. Need $f(W_i) \rightarrow W_{i+1}$


Using h that can be iterated
we must be able to get back to the message space, i.e.



ϕ : could be identity if $H \subseteq M$; needs to be deterministic

E.g. PDF has some flexible part at end; ϕ varies that which does not impact what is displayed

Once I have a collision at DP, how do I get $x, x' \in M$ for the first collision? distinguished point



When DP is reached, report DP, starting point x_{j_0} and number of steps, say l_j , to DP.

If x_{i_0} and x_{j_0} lead to same DP, with lengths l_i and l_j with $l_i \leq l_j$ then compare $h(x)$ to $h(x_{j_0-l_i-l_j})$ for $x \in M$, update includes ϕ .